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Abstract | Edmund Husserl’s phenomenological method has mostly been applied
to epistemological questions. However, it also has great potential for analysing
phenomena of social and political relevance. This text outlines a phenomenol-
ogy of social precariousness, showing how it impacts the experiential, temporal,
perceptual and self-perceptual structures of the subject, thereby influencing inter-
generational relations.
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1 Between Public and Private:
the Point of View of Precarity
In what follows, I aim to use some fundamental instruments of the phenomeno-
logical method to address the wide-ranging social phenomenon of precarity. Pre-
carity is characterized by insecurity of work and life conditions, pressure to adapt
to constantly changing work tasks, times, and place of residence, as well as the
reduction of the horizon of predictability of personal and social development.1
This analysis of the growing precarity of life is of interest beyond only its rele-
vance to our current situation. Rather, it relates to a constellation of problems
suitable for showing the close constitutive relationship that exists between the
personal, private, psychological, and individual dimensions of human existence
and the institutional and collective dimension of associated life. In this sense, Ju-
dith Butler’s description of precarity as a “politically induced condition”2 acquires
its full meaning. The explicit reference to the political structure of society not only
indicates the genesis of precarity as a modern phenomenon, but also reveals its
ultimate significance for anthropological and philosophical research.
Accordingly, describing precarity means observing the processes that dynam-
ically bind the public and the private. I believe that phenomenology can provide
fruitful methodological tools to explore the subjective meaning of this dynamic,
thereby proving itself useful as a method for developing a possible public ethics.
In this sense, the analysis of precarity gains an exemplary character within phe-
nomenological scholarship since it questions the potential of phenomenological
description to ground a reflection that does not separate individual moral choices
from social context, without, however, dissolving the sense of subjectivity into
macro-social dynamics.
1 Relevant in this context is the distinction between the precariousness of life, on the one hand, in-
tended as an ontological condition of finitude and contingency, also stressed by religious views and
particularly by Christianity, and, on the other hand, “precarity” as a specific social phenomena con-
nected to the current organization of work and social hierarchy. This distinction has been investigated
by (Lorey 2015) The term precarity can be traced back to French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu, who in-
tended it primarily as the expanding condition of job insecurity in meaningful connection with personal
subordination (Bourdieu 1998, p. 82).
2 In her approach, Butler not only distinguishes the precariousness of life from precarity, but also
underlines how political and social institutions produce precarity by failing at their proper function,
which is balancing the natural precariousness of the human condition, thereby producing precarity
(Butler 2009, p. II).
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2 Phenomenology as a Radical Empiricism
The French branch of the philosophy initiated by Edmund Husserl – animated by
the influential work of J.-P. Sartre, M. Merleau-Ponty, P. Nizan and later E. Levinas
– was forced to take a stand in the politically challenging context of the post-war
era and was soon mixed with existentialism. Yet, phenomenology in the Husserlian
sense remained for a long time caught up in what appear to be purely theoretical
and epistemological questions, thereby keeping it far away from more concrete
political issues. Only in recent years has interest in political phenomena grown to
the point of inaugurating a new tendency dedicated to “critical phenomenology,”
which focuses on social and politically relevant phenomena such as race, gender,
and justice.3
The phenomenological method, nevertheless, is based on an analysis of ex-
perience. As a description of phenomena, in fact, phenomenology can be char-
acterised as a ‘radical empiricism’, i.e. as a philosophy aiming at bringing the
peculiarity of experience, its structure, and dynamics to the fore. In the 1910/11
lectures, which represent Husserl’s breakthrough from the Logical Investigations
to a new phase of his reflection, the philosopher oers his audience a succinct
statement of his concern: „Wir beschreiben, wie wohl zu beachten ist, nur das,
was jedes Ich als solches vorfindet“ (“We describe, it should be noted, only that
which each I finds as such”) (Husserl 2006, p. 3). Accordingly, phenomenology
starts from what can be found directly by everyone. Each of us is considered a
legitimate source of meaningful experience. Yet, the methodologically crucial de-
mand for accuracy and faithfulness to phenomena harbours the hidden danger
of dispersion. This is because beginning with what is found means “something
dierent for each of us” (Husserl 2006, p. 2). The problem of phenomenology as
a radical empiricism is, therefore, how to avoid getting lost in the multiplicity of
objects and relative descriptions. This problem should not lead us to a relativistic
or even sceptical solution. It cannot be solved by simply giving up the goal of a
secured and certain knowledge of determined objects. Dealing with the problem
of relativism, Husserl rather grasps the concept of “evidence” intended as an in-
termediate form of knowledge which is neither objective in the sense of the third-
person-perspective, nor subjective in a psychological and solipsistic sense. The
phenomenological description aims to unfold “evidence,” intended as a reliable,
meaningful and fulfilled relationship between the subject and the object.
Here, the role of the subject-as-observer comes to the foreground. Neverthe-
less, the subject itself is neither considered the final authority, which would lead to
3 See the debate raised by the recent publication of (Weiss, Salamon, and Murphy 2019).
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relativism, nor an interchangeable abstract hypothesis. Rather, it is characterised
by its ability to transform object-related certainty into meaningful evidence. The
ego functions neither as a creator of the world nor as a mere recipient of stimuli.
Phenomenology rather emphasises the ‘transformative’ power of subjective expe-
rience and interprets it as a ‘performance,’ i.e. as an experience ‘of someone’ and
not just ‘of something.’ Experience is not exhausted in the external relation be-
tween two pre-existing poles, but proves to be a phenomenon of transformation
in which subjective and objective elements merge together.
Husserl refers to such a connection with the concept of “constitution,”4 which
points to the meaning-bestowing capacity of the subject. Unfortunately, the no-
tion of constitution caused many idealistic misunderstandings as early as the pub-
lication of the Ideas (1913). Yet, it is precisely in the lectures of 1910/11 that a sim-
ple and very concrete description of the eective peculiarity of the ego can be
found. Here, Husserl describes the ego as “‘the thing’ around which is grouped a
material environment that continues into the infinite (das ‚Ding‘, um welches sich
eine ins Unbegrenzte fortgehende dingliche Umgebung gruppiert)” (Husserl 1973,
p. 113). The I does not constitute the world in the sense that it simply projects its
own thoughts, representations, or wishes on the world, which would be taken as a
mere surface for these items to be projected upon. Rather, in the process of con-
stitution, the I concentrates and polarizes its perceptions, experiences, and expec-
tations around the intended thing, thereby conveying it with a certain orientation
and meaning. The permanent performance of subjectivity consists in imprinting
directions and relations on an environment that would otherwise be a mere collec-
tion of things. Egoic life transforms mere environment into a meaningful horizon
and – epistemologically – mere subjective certainty into constitutive evidence.
This means, however, that the full unfolding of subjective life needs a horizon
that “continues into infinity”5 and, at the same time, presupposes the possibility
of standing in such a horizon and operating as an actively grouping centre. From
this perspective, the constitutional potential of the ego represents, in my view,
the lowest and unnoticed level of subjective autonomy that is indispensable for
subjective life.
The notion of autonomy, which is traditionally found at the centre of political
and moral debates, is thus observed to be originally rooted in the perceptive and
self-perceptive performances of the subject, in its capacity to bestow sense to the
surrounding world. Therefore, in order to approach the description of the eects
of precarity on the subject’s life, it will be necessary to briefly explore at least two
4 See the important section dedicated to constitution in (Husserl 1989).
5 For a phenomenologico-Husserlian analysis of the concept of infinity, see (Altobrando 2013).
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elements that characterise subjective life by means of phenomenological analysis:
autonomy and the internal temporality of the subject. By clarifying how these
essential aspects of subjective life function it will become easier to shed light on
the social processes that profoundly aect it, inducing a radical transformation
deep into its proper foundations.
3 The Basic Form of Autonomy
As radical empiricism, phenomenology starts from the assumption that subjective
life is only possible in and from experience. The syntheses that take place in our
experience make up our entire reality, which is the only reality in which cognition,
decision, and action are possible for us. This constitutive achievement represents
a fundamental prefiguration and precondition of personal autonomy. The analysis
of precarity must start precisely from this minimal idea of autonomy in order to
focus on the functionality and needs of the subject so as to observe how they are
transformed under current life circumstances. In this sense, autonomy should be
understood not as a primarily moral character of the subject, but as its constant
performativity.
The autonomy of the subject is expressed concretely in every perceptive per-
formance in which the subject shapes its world and – above all – itself according
to its viewpoint and needs. In this process, subjectivity delineates an environ-
ment of meanings and relevances. This environment is ultimately the only world
in which we can live. In this infinite process, the ego also “constitutes” itself. The
self-referential side of this dynamic that constitutes the individual life-story is in-
separable from its world-constitutive side. The I explores the world by discovering
and shaping itself. The relevancies that assert themselves in my perception and
orient me within the world both point to and reveal certain structures, tenden-
cies, and needs of my own person. Between the world and the subject, we find
that there is not only a mere mirroring taking place,6 but there is rather a recipro-
cal shaping process in which the two poles – subjective and objective – are only
separable by abstraction.
Autonomy is an essential precondition of this complex achievement. Only sec-
ondarily does it refer to the dimension of morality and institutions. Much “earlier”
in a genetic perspective, or more profoundly in an existential sense, autonomy
denotes the sense-bestowing self-reference that produces and grounds myself as
6 The metaphor of mirroring spread by (Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia 2008) to explain the functioning of
a specific class of neurons is in this sense as useful as limiting if it is taken as the all-encompassing
model to grasp human interaction.
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a subject. My essence as a subject (not as an organic being, of course, but as
an actor, as a subject of opinions and rights, as a bearer of emotions and rela-
tions) is founded on my ability to exercise my multifaceted capacities by relating
to the world. The consistency of my own person is the consistency of my world.
My own subjective coherence is grounded in the coherence of my relations and
worldviews. My contradictions work themselves out in the tensions and divisions
of my world. This process must not be understood as a flat projection or reflection
of the ego onto the world, nor as an abstract metaphysical idealism. It is rather
a creative and open process in which we become ourselves only by shaping our
environment. Our being consists in the complex unfolding of personal autonomy
through perception, exploration, and action.
4 The Expanding Horizon of Time
The autonomy of the subject is not therefore a self-isolating dispositive. The au-
tonomous position does not isolate the subject from the surrounding world. It
does not coincide with a conscious reflection that follows perception or action
and makes judgments about it after the fact. It is not yet the inner dialogue that
often accompanies our lives, described by Hanna Arendt as the basis of our moral
capacity. It is rather the awareness that we can never only deal directly and imme-
diately with things and circumstances of various natures without them eecting
our inner form. Our interactions with things are at the same time always interac-
tions with ourselves.
The reverberation of our sensations and activities presupposes an inner plu-
rality. To enable this everyday refractive eect, consciousness must be understood
as neither a monolith nor as a linear chain of acts and facts. On this point, the
phenomenological description oers to us a representation of consciousness as
a unified and interconnected stream that carries many dierent currents within
it. The stream of consciousness harbours the inner eects and counter-eects
of manifold drives, desires, expectations, and perceptions. However, this is not
merely an empirical phenomenon. Rather, phenomenological analysis identifies
the basic precondition of the intrasubjective self-resonance in the form of an inner
temporality.
We live in time: ‘When? How long? Since when?’ are central questions of our
communication as well as our self-dialogue. Such questions are not infrequently
characterised by a forceful emotional tone and usually convey more than a need
for simple information. We live and plan our lives in calendar days and hours.
Timelines are the most requested, dreaded, and stressful documents we have to
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deliver on every project. Yet, we do not only live in this ‘objectified,’ measured,
conventional time. Rather, philosophical and existential reflection highlights var-
ious forms of experienced, subjective time that are just as vital to us.
Even our body displays its own temporality based on the recurring drives and
needs for rest, nourishment, proximity, and contact. This dynamic characterises
itself as an empirical temporality, which is, however, not merely material and phys-
iological. Rather, each need is grounded in our consciousness, it triggers individual
reactions and makes our singular personality echo dierently in each case. Each
need, fulfilled or unfulfilled, determines subjectivity in its own way, sedimenting
itself in consciousness, bending us, creating habits, and thereby making a signifi-
cant contribution to our self-resonance and self-constitution.
This deep web of experience consists in a felt temporality that constantly in-
heres to experience. Every experience presents itself in the form of the present,
it occupies us and fills our present, thus that the scope of this present itself is
thereby determined. The evidential present-ness of experience, however, cannot
exist without an inner reference to the past. Every experience carries with it a hori-
zon of the past that determines the ‘whence’ of experience. Husserl describes such
a temporal echo as a “comet’s tail”7 that follows every experience. Every experi-
ence slowly sinks into the past. The experience does not disappear with the past,
but rather reverberates like a voice that continues to have an eect, although it
becomes fainter and fainter. Our connection with what is experienced necessarily
consists at the same time in a letting go and a keeping, which transforms contents
and forms. Such a transformation instigates the very possibility of experiencing
something and integrating it into our conscious lives.
However, the eective reference to the past represents only one aspect of
inner temporality. Every experience also carries within it a future horizon, thanks
to which it can extend “forward,” thereby anticipating and establishing a dialogue
with future experiences. The possibilities of experience that are anticipated in
this process are not mere fictions, they are not exhausted in fantasies. Rather, they
play a necessary role in the orientation and further course of the experience itself.
We would not take a step if it were not implicitly “expected” in our perception
that the ground would hold, that the laws of gravity would not be overturned, etc.
Hence, every experience carries expectations within it, wherein its meaning often
consists even more of expectations than of actual present knowledge.
The outlined structures of expectation (future) and the slow sinking of experi-
ence (past) form two non-presences that surround and make possible every actual
7 ”Aber diese Jetztauassung ist gleichsam der Kern zu einem Kometenschweif von Retentionen, auf
die frühere Jetzpunkte der Bewegung bezogen” (Husserl 1966, p. 30).
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present experience. They designate empty horizons that prepare the necessary
resonance for every experiential situation. These temporal structures provide the
resonance space for every experience and thus for a meaningful life. The human
conscious being needs such a temporal virtual expansion to make sense of life and
be able to experience the surrounding environment. In this sense, it is not true
that our being temporal inevitably makes us contingent and precarious. Rather,
lived temporality is simultaneously the condition of possibility of coherence and
subsistence of our psychic life.
The vital inner temporality is characterised by its continuity and fluidity. Noth-
ing remains isolated and unconnected in consciousness. Each sinking experience
aects the one that follows and each current one anticipates further moments to
come. Experience flows and connects. However, in doing so, it is also constantly
transforming. Inner temporality denotes an elemental but essential creative force
that bars our inner world from any rigidity. Subjective life is rooted in this primitive
creativity and defines itself through it. Only thanks to the inner empty horizons
of anticipation and retention can the process of ongoing transformation and re-
shaping that constitutes a meaningful experiential life take place. Only through
this can we meet the challenges of the world without breaking down or resign-
ing. Only through the inner space provided by anticipation and retention this will
profoundly dierent experiences be integrated as stages of personal development
and appear as cornerstones of our autonomous self-constitution.
With that said, this inner processuality is the exact opposite of the omnipresent
schedules, work plans, timetables in which we divide and objectify time. It is in
fact based on the creative potential of the empty inner horizons; it requires the
possibility to expand in time, to anticipate future experiences and to draw on past
ones. How can such an inner temporal resonance be lived out in times of precar-
ious work, flexible life, and technological simultaneity?
5 Disruption of Time, Simultaneity, and Intergenerational Alien-
ation
One might assume that the essential function of inner temporality just outlined
would be stored and guarded in the inner life like an intimate treasure or indi-
vidual resource, thereby grounding the stream of experience. But, as described
in §2, our experiential life primarily represents a resonance space for everything
we encounter. Environment and surroundings, intersubjective relationships and
interactions, incidents and external caesurae form the inescapable fabric of our
lives and influence its rhythm. Precarity can be interpreted in this framework as a
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peculiar way of organising objective time that has profound eects on inner tem-
porality.
The objective order of time is not merely parallel to subjective time. Rather,
serious interferences between the two can be identified, which point to a stress-
ful conflict. As an appropriation of people’s vitality and time for the purposes of
production and profit, any organisation of work implies profound eects on the
lives of individuals and communities. In this respect, we should avoid the ideali-
sation of past, overcome, or marginalised ways of working, which entails an undue
trivialisation of earlier – but no less violent – forms of exploitation. The current
flexibilisation of work, however, presents some peculiarities that stand in direct
and conflict-laden contrast to the structure of inner temporality and to its function
as a space of resonance.
(i) The first striking element of the current way of life is the fragmentation of
work, i.e. the demand to radically change not only one’s own tasks but the whole
field of work again and again. Repeated changes in working conditions and areas
as well as places of work are now part of the life of workers from all backgrounds
as a more or less passively suered fact. Life loses continuity and becomes a
chain of moments closed in themselves that are unable to communicate with each
other. The preceding experiences no longer sink into a sedimented horizon, but
disappear because the entire environment has become alien and inappropriate
to them in each case. By losing this continuity of context (working environment,
place of residence, rhythm of life), past experiences also lose their core signifi-
cance. They are no longer involved in the co-creation of current experience and
therefore become alienated, disconnected, and meaningless elements. We are
witnessing here a progressive break between past experiences and the processes
of shaping present meaning. What has been experienced, learnt, and exercised
in past contexts does not resonate when placed within the present context. The
horizon of the past becomes alien and the flow of consciousness is interrupted.
The inner horizon of the future, which is based on the structured and fundamental
expectation of continuity, is equally threatened, especially by forms of work that
structurally consist of individual projects. With Heidegger, we could say that such
projects miss and even prevent the characteristic “Entwurf ” (projection) crucial to
authentic existence (Heidegger 1927, ch. 31). Imagination, self-imagination, and
self-projection into the future are made impossible by working conditions that fo-
cus less on the actual usefulness of work and more on whether or not the task at
hand has merely been completed. In the performance of isolated, finite tasks, the
ultimate goal of the activity and its purpose fade away. The consequences of the
action lie in a distant future and lose their significance in the face of the imme-
diate urge of completing the action itself in a fixed time. This dynamic, however,
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not only limits the perspective of the future, but renders it ineective. Thus, both
“forward” and “backward,” the temporal resonance of the subject is blocked, pre-
vented, frozen. Work organisation demands an exclusive and blind focus on the
current present, which sacrifices the complexity of the inner resonance of the self
in its past and future dimensions in favour of the manageability and flexibility of
current market conditions.
As we noted above, the very vitality of the stream of consciousness depends on
the possibility of extending itself into progressively empty, but always operative,
horizons of past and future. In this sense, the diculty of integrating past experi-
ences and future perspectives into the present occupied by defined tasks has an
immediate eect on the vitality of consciousness, its elasticity, and its possibility
of constituting meaning in an integrated and eective way. The progressive corro-
sion of internal time seriously weakens agency, performative autonomy, and the
possibility of making personal decisions.
(ii) A second aspect of negated resonance points to the characteristic simul-
taneity that current working conditions demand. Thanks to technological infras-
tructures that keep us connected constantly and everywhere, working time and
private lifetime easily coincide. This requires everyone to be in dierent places, to
interact with dierent environments, to play out dierent patterns of interaction
at the same time. Instead of being experienced in the life of consciousness in the
form of an ongoing deepening of experience as the constitutive result of inner
temporality, i.e. as the sedimentation and the complication of the experiencing
moments, imultaneity, is now lived out in the opposite forms of simplification, of
non-commitment, of immediate coincidence. We shift from the constitutive simul-
taneity of lived temporality to the fixation of time moments in repeated tasks.
Also in this case, the consequences for the human capacity to synthetize ex-
perience and make sense of their own life are deep and dicult to foresee. Simul-
taneity is no longer the constant achievement of consciousness, but rather takes
the form of a relational short-circuiting. The mediation operated by retention and
protention, observed in the inner functioning of time, fades away and is replaced
by the immediateness of isolated work-tasks.
In this context, no separation between work and non-work is allowed. What’s
more, this kind of immediate coincidence actually hides much deeper rifts in one’s
own existential environment and inner temporality. For the worker who is required
to live out his private life in the company and whose private sphere is co-shaped
by the company, the abysses that cross the stream of experience remain veiled.
Its inner and social resonance as a subject is not merely weakened by this new
situation and lifestyle. Indeed, it furthermore shifts into externality and is thus
transformed into a form of social dependence.
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On the one hand, recognition, as the crucial goal of communication and human
interaction, loses its characteristic processuality and mediation, in both of which
the subject is at play with its various inner components. On the other hand, recog-
nition is played up as an immediate one-sided and narcissistic demand that hin-
ders, rather than promotes, the process of self-knowledge and self-constituting.
(iii) A final aspect of our brief phenomenology of precarity goes back to the
generative significance of temporality. Both psychology and phenomenology em-
phasise the central importance of the interaction between generations for the
self-constitution of a subjectivity that is temporally predisposed. At this point, our
observation shifts toward a more inclusive and comprehensive dimension. It no
longer focuses on the individual, but instead includes intersubjective life in time.
Our focus is no longer inner temporality, but the historical temporal dimension
that includes dierent generations. Additionally, at this level, the precarisation of
work – and life conditions aects the constitution of meaning and ultimately the
ecacy of personal autonomy.
The relationship between earlier and later generations and one’s own position,
as well as the mechanisms of recognition and distancing that take place in this
context, are not contingent factors in the self-constitution of an individual and
human group. Rather, they are indispensable and inexhaustible processes that
profoundly determine the life of every individual. In our relationship with the
older generation, we experience contents and lifestyles of times that are past and
yet continue to have an eect on us. In our imagined relationship with future
generations, we find an echo of our current desires and expectations.
The precarisation of living conditions stops and distorts such processes by
hindering the traditional succession of generational tasks and functions in various
ways. The extension of the working period for the older generation and the slowing
down of access to work for the newer ones creates a deceptive simultaneity that
is not matched by equivalence in power, resources, and social influence.
At the two extremes of this process, the younger generation is forced to wait in
order to achieve work autonomy and the older generation is forced to work longer
than expected. Both experience a frustration that prevents mutual recognition.
Generations drift apart, mutual needs become opaque, resentment grows and is
rooted in mutual alienation. The inter-subjective dimension stretching across per-
sonal history breaks down, thereby giving rise not to physiological and individu-
ated conflicts but to radical estrangement.
Apparently, we are all called upon to perform in the same way, regardless of
age and condition. Apparently, corresponding opportunities for work and con-
sumption are promised to all. Nevertheless, this only leads to the multiplication
of expectations and demands without an eective intergenerational resonance
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becoming possible.
As we have seen, for phenomenology, temporality is not an extrinsic dimen-
sion or a purely individual intuition. Rather, with its internal and intersubjec-
tive dimensions, it delineates the proper space of consciousness and provides
the essential condition of possibility for the constitution of meaning and the self-
constitution of subjectivity. The precarity of lifestyles has a radical influence pri-
marily on the temporality of the subject. It is, in the full sense, an appropriation
and transformation of the time of the subject, which is fragmented and redis-
tributed according to a new and more flexible organisation of work. This, however,
has important consequences not only for living conditions, but also for the very
capacity of perception and self-perception of subjects, and therefore for their pos-
sibility of developing an autonomous vision of the world and of themselves.
6 Conclusion
The fragmentation of time horizons through (i) precarious working conditions, (ii)
the abstract simultaneity of technology, and (iii) the distortion of intergenerational
interactions constitute three moments of alienation that clearly reveal the impact
of precarity on the existential structure of time. We witness the loss of present
and future horizons due to constant uprooting and the pressure to consistently
transform work and life contexts. We have described the transformation of the
living simultaneity of the horizons of consciousness into the lifeless simultane-
ity of technology-mediated relationships. The permanent being connected takes
the place of an intimate interconnectedness of one’s experiences, expectations,
desires. Life-experience and complex knowledge are substituted by pre-defined
competences and skills. Finally, intergenerational conflicts take the form of a pro-
found reciprocal alienation of generations forced to give up their personal and
professional fulfilment in order to comply with the distorted times of the labour
market.
Such a change is not merely theoretical. Rather, it aects the subjective ability
to experience inner and social resonance, to reverberate both within oneself and
with others, to multiply and thus to unfold one’s creative potential. Subjective au-
tonomy is thus so severely challenged that it becomes questionable as to whether
an actual human, rational, and meaningful life can be essentially preserved and
continued under such circumstances or whether we are not rather facing a radical,
as well as threatening, de-subjectification8 that carries with it a shattering inabil-
8 Recently, the de-subjectification process is reflected upon by the trans-humanistic understanding
of modern anthropology. See (Hansell and Grassie 2011).
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ity to answer for oneself and relate to oneself. The “fluidification” (Bauman 2000)
of society has produced the serious side eect of a frozen consciousness that re-
mains in mere identity with itself in order not to lose itself definitively. The theme
of identity proliferates, invading not only the public space of politics, but also the
private dimension of the struggling individual. The whole energy of existence is
concentrated in a search for identity that locks the subject into a defensive, in-
dividualistic, and hostile position. Even when such a search seams successful,
however, the rigid and anticipated identity that results does not really come into
play as a resource. Instead, it is a serious obstacle to the necessary process of
self-constitution and self-development of personality. In order to search for our-
selves, we stop developing the relational potential that would otherwise enrich
our personality.
Personal autonomy then becomes a defensive self-identification and abstract
distinction rather than a condition for the possibility of further discoveries and
designs. Autonomy, which as we have seen above is also linked to the possibil-
ity of unfolding internal temporality, becomes a rigid position, a stubborn self-
assertion. Finally, precarity threatens to eat away at its own anthropological pre-
conditions: Flexibility turns into rigidity, creativity into fixity of identity.
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